NATIONAL BANK vs. ELIOT BANK.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts.
NATIONAL BANK vs. ELIOT BANK.
1. Where a check in the usual form, payable to bearer, is drawn by B. on theE.
Bank, and passes into the hands and ownership of the N. Bank, the latter bank, the
holder, cannot maintain an action in its own name against the former bank, the
drawee, the check never having been accepted by the drawee, but its payment
refused. Per HUNTINGTON, J.; ABBOTT, J., dissenting..
2. But where the third party, seeking to enforce the contract, is particularly designated in the coutract, he may maintain an action in his own name for a breach of
the undertaking.
3. The contract between a bank and its customer in deposits is in the nature of a
loan, and the relation that of debtor and creditor.
4. A check, in order to avail the holder, must be presented, accepted, and charged.

This action was brought by the plaintiff bank as the bearer and
owner of a certain check, drawn by Bacon, Price & Co., on the
defendant bank, a copy of which is as follows:
"ELIOT BANK, Boston, Jan. 22, 1856.

Pay to 348, or bearer, fourteen hundred dollars.
"BACON, PRICE & CO."
"To the Cashier.
It appeared in evidence that Bacon, Price & Co. were depositors
at the Eliot bank, and that said bank had been in the habit of
receiving and paying the checks of that firm for some time previous to
the date of this suit; that the said check was presented for payment
on the day of its date, and that the defendant bank then had the
sum of $2,009.67 to the credit of Bacon, Price & Co. in their
deposit account, but refused to pay said check. It also appeared that
at the time of the presentment of said check the Eliot bank had certain promissory notes, signed by Whittier & Warren, who had failed,
and endorsed by Bacon, Price & Co., not then due, and for a greater
amount than the sum to the credit of Bacon, Price & Co. in their
deposit account.
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The case was taken from the jury and argued before the full cour
and the opinion of the court delivered by
HUNTINGTON, J.-In
this case the plaintiff corporation was thc
holder of a check, drawn in common form by the defendant corporation, and seasonably presented at the counter of the Eliot bank
for payment. Payment and acceptance were refused, and the
plaintiff, as holder, seeks to maintain this action for such refusal.
Whether the drawers would have a remedy in their own names
is not the point in dispute. Can the payee or holder of the check
intervene, and in his own name hold the bank upon which it
is drawn ? As this question lies at the foundation of the suit, it is
not now necessary to take notice of the other facts found or agreed
between the parties-demand, protest, the state of accounts, and
dealings by the respective banks.
The authorities, so far as they speak of the precise nature of the
contract between the bank and its customer in common deposits,
treat it as in the nature of a loan, and the relation arising as
that of debtor and creditor, not a deposit merely. The bank opens
an account of debit and credit. It employs the money for its
own use; it becomes part of its general assets. No third party is
named or known, and the bank is liable to answer the checks of the
customer to that amount. Carr vs. Carr, 1 Merivale, 541 ; -Devaynes vs. INoble, Ibid., 568; Commercial Bank of.Aibavy vs.
Hughes, 17 Wend. 100; Sims vs. Bond, 2 Nev. and Man. 608.
In this last case A, in his own name, deposited with 0., his banker,
funds which were the proceeds of a partnership sale of partnership
effects, which belonged to A, together with one B. The question
was, whether in a suit against the banker for the money so deposited
by A, B could be joined with A, and it was held that he could not,
because, say the court, there was no privity of contract with the
partners A and B, and, it is added, "sums which are paid to the
credit of a-customer with a banker, though usually called deposits,
are in truth loans by the customer to the banker, and plaintiffs who
seek to recover the balance of such an account must prove that the
loans were made by them." It is obvious that the plaintiffs, in the
case at bar, could not recover on this ground.
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In Byles on Bills, p. 16, note, the author seems to deny that the
holder of an unpaid check has an equitable claim on the drawee,
even in bankruptcy, so as to prove under the fiat as assignee of
a chose in action, and he cites a case where commissioners in
bankruptcy, after taking time to consider, disallowed the claims
of several holders of checks on the bankrupts, who claimed to prove
as equitable assignees of choses in action.
The contract between the bank and the customer rests on an implied obligation, one and entire, between the parties only, and not
for the benefit of any third person. It is well settled that an order
or draft for a part only of the debt or liability of the drawee does
not, against his consent, amount to an assignment of any portion of
the debt or liability, and does not authorize the institution of a suit
in the name of the assignee, for the whole or any part, because a
debtor is not to have his responsibilities so far varied as to subject
him to distinct demands on the part of several persons, when his
contract was one and entire. Gibson vs. UCook, 20 Pick. 15.
In Bullard vs. Bandall, 1 Gray, 606, the judgment of the
court proceeded on the ground that a check must not only be presented, but accepted by the bank and charged, in order to avail the
holder, and that a verbal assent of the cashier, away from the
counter of the bank, cannot avail him. If the bank, therefore, as
in the case at bar, refuse to accept and pay, it seems that the holder
has nothing of which he can "avail" himself as against the bank,
and can maintain no action in his own name. In Taylor vs. Wilson,
11 Met. 52, it was held that if a creditor, in payment of a debt,
take a check upon a bank, and the bank fail, or the check be dishonored,. the check is mere evidence of a debt due from the drawer,
not a payment, and the creditor's remedies against the drawer remain entire, if he is not guilty of laches.
The usage of banks in giving what are known as certificates of
deposit, where third persons are intended to have the benefit of
money thus passed to the banks, in which the money is -expressly
stated to be payable to the order of such third person on the return
of the certificate, throws some light on the nature of the contract in
cases of common deposits, where no third party is recognized in
terms. It is not the custom to present checks for mere acceptance,
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or to give notice, or for the holder to sue the bank upon a refusal to
accept. If an action can be sustained by the holder of a check
against the bank, under the circumstances of this case, it is singular
that, so far as our search has reached, no precedent of the sort can
be found in the books.
On the other hand, there are dicta of judges, and of text-books,
and analogies of the law, to the effect that such an action cannot be
sustained.
In Bellamy vs. Majoribanks, 8 E. L. and Eq. Rep. 517, where
the question was as to the effect of "crossing checks," the Attorney
General, Cockburn, says, in the course of his argument, that "the
banker owes no duty to the holder, and is liable to no action at his
suit, if the check is not honored." This was not controverted by
the opposing counsel. But what is of more weight; Baron Parke,
in his opinion in the same case, treats it as a familiar well-settled principle, and says :-" The lawful holder of the check is of
necessity entitled to receive payment of it. He could not sue the
drawee unless' the drawee had accepted the check, a practice not
usual, but he could sue the drawer for non-payment, if he was the
holder for value."
When, therefore, in Marzetti vs. Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 415, it
was held that a banker was liable in an action of tort or contract to
the customer for refusing to pay a check when in funds, though no
actual damage was sustained, on the ground that the contract was
to pay all drafts presented in a reasonable time after receiving the
money, it is clear that the court did not mean to decide that the
banker was also liable to the holder of the check, or under a contract with him.
The consideration that he was not liable to the holder would
seem to be a good reason why he should be liable over to the drawer
in tort or contract.
. In C1hapman vs. WFite, 2 Selden, 412, it is said the drawee owes
no duty to the holder of a check until after it is accepted. The
right of the depositor is a chose in action. The draft or check of
the depositor does not transfer the debt, or a lien upon it, to a third
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person without the assent of the depositary, and _Dykerm vs. Leather
Man. New Bank, 11 Paige, 616, is cited.
In Chitty on Bills, under the head of "Acceptances," p. 280,
281, it is said- a banker is liable to an action by the customer if he
should refuse, having sufficient money in hand to honor the check of
his customer, but that, in case of refusal, the holder has not any
remedy at law against the drawee or banker on the funds in his
hand. The law, however, says the author, is otherwise in. France.
He adds, as to bills of exchange, that if the drawee, by course of
business, has impliedly engaged to accept and afterwards refuses to
perform, then he is liable to the drawer, but not to any other party.
Even this has not been adolted as a rule of law in this country. To
introduce it here now, as to checks, would be introducing a novel
principle, multiplying the distinctions and rules of mercantile law.
There is good authority for holding that an express precedent
promise to accept a draft, to be afterwards drawn, is a chose in
action not negotiable or assignable so as to enable the assignee to
maintain an action in his own name.
Chancellor Kent says, it seems to be a little difficult to understand
how the endorsee 6f a bill, subsequently drawn, can charge the
drawee with acceptance by virtue of such a preceding promise, which
is not of itself assignable, and is strictly no part of the negotiable
contract. McEvers vs. Mason, 10 Johns. R. 215 ; Ontario Bank vs.
l1ortlington, 12 Wend. 598. This reasoning applies with quite as
much force to a check "subsequently drawn" as to an ordinary bill
of exchange. That such a known legal distinction exists between
checks and bills of exchange would be a difficult proposition to support upon any decided cases.
A further inquiry arises whether the contract between the customer and the banker can be brought within the principle, now well
established, and which has been applied to a certain class of cases to
be found in the books, viz : that if A receives money of B, to the use
of C, though there is no communication between A and C, and no
privity other than what arises from the duty of paying, an action
iyill lie in behalf of C against A. In other words, that when one persor., for a valuable consideration, engages with another by simple
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contract to do some act for the benefit of a third, the latter, who
would enjoy the benefit of the act, may maintain an action for the
breach of such engagement.
This principle has been applied in this State in Ball vs. lIarston,
I7 Mass. 575; in Arnold vs. Lyman, Ibid. 400; and in Carnegie
vs. Morrison, 2 Met. 402. In these cases, however, and in the
cases cited by the court in giving the opinion in 2 Metcalf, it will
be found that the third party, seeking tb enforce the contract, is
particularly designated and named in the contract, that the person
who is to receive the benefit is specifically pointed out.
In fall vs. Marston the defendant was specially directed, when
he received the remittance, to pay 'over a certain sum named to the
plaintiff, and the court held that he was to be charged as an agent,
who had accepted the agency, and that he could not follow his
directions as to receiving the money and disobey them as to the
application of it.
In Arnold vs. Lyman, the defendant, Lyman, took an assignment of the notes and goods of one Hutchins, and in consideration promised him to pay certain liabilities due to himself, and
also a note of the plaintiff, who was mentioned by name. The
court held that the plaintiff might sue the assignee, defendant, on
the ground that the promise might be considered as legally made
to the several creditors named in the assignment, because the promise
was to pay certain particular debts, and that, therefore, it might be treated as a promise to the creditors, and that, bringing the
action by the plaintiff, to whom a note was due, was an assent to the
promise, it being for his interest that it was made. But in the case
of a bank deposit or loan, like that at bar, no particular debts are
named, no particular creditors, and there is no appropriation of the
moneys at the time of the deposit.
In Carnegievs. Morrison, the third party, plaintiff, was named in
the letter of credit writteii by the defendants, through which the
defendant was'held liable as on a contract made with the plaintiff,
though the letter was merely addressed to a person who owed the
plaintiffs, and who procured the letter of credit for their benefit.
The contract between the bank and its customer in deposits does
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not, therefore, seem to come withih the letter or spirit of the principle
and reasoning recognized in these cases of money received by A
from B for the use of C, or for the benefit of a third person. To
apply it to a loan or deposit would seem to be forcing it into service
for which it was never designed, and for which there is no precedent. Judgment must therefore be for defendant.
ABBOTT, J., (dissenting.)-After the best consideration that I have
been able to give to the question involved in this case, I -have been
unable to agree with the other members of the court in the conclusion
at which they have arrived. Although, unfortunately, there are no
adjudicated cases in England or this country directly in point, I
think a careful consideration of the principles applicable, and of
decisions in analogous cases, will enable us to come to a satisfactory
result, and one in accordance with the universal practice and understanding of the commercial and business community, and every
member sof .it who may have occasion to give or take a bank check.'
It is certainly important to all that the respective rights and obligations of the holder and drawer of a banker's check should be settled and defined, so that upon a matter of such constant and often
recurring importance as the law governing that class of securities,
there should be no doubt. The simple question presented in this
case is,, whether a bank or banker with whom a customer has
deposited cash, to be drawn out upon his checks, is liable in a suit by
the holder of a check wh6 has presented it at a proper time and
been refused payment, although the drawee is in funds deposited
for the purpose of being appropriated for such payments.
I think the law to be, that if a holder of a bank check presents
it at a proper time and demands payment, the bank possessing funds
of the drawer; deposited for the purpose of meeting checks to be
drawn by him, and payment is refused, he can recover the amount
of it in an action against the bank. What is the contract between
the depositor and the bank ? Beyond all question simply this: In
consideration that the depositor will let his cash remain with the
bank, either with or without interest, as shall be agreed upon, until
he wants it, they agree to pay it out in such sums as he shall draw
checks for, to any persons who shall present such checks. This is
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the contract between the bank and its depositor in the ordinary
course of business, as it is understood by the whole commercial
community, and as it is defined by the law. The money is deposited
for the convenience and safety of the customer, and the consideration to the bank for keeping and paying it out on checks is that they
have the use of it while thus deposited. The drawing of the check
is in and of itself an appropriation of its amount out of the funds in
the banker's hands; and, after notice of such appropriation, neither
the drawee nor the bank can withhold the funds so appropriated.
In re Brown, 2 Story, 516 ; Story on Pr. Notes, § 489 ; Bcehn vs.
Stirlivg, 7 Tenn. R 429 ; 3 Kent's Com. 104, note c.
It is of no consequence, and does not alter the relation between
the parties that cash so taken is not held in specie, as a special deposit to be kept and returned in the same form as deposited, or that
it amounts merely to a credit to the customer on the part of a bank,
a
and goes into their general assets. The only important inquiry is
upon what contract is the money taken, and does the bank, by
taking it, assume and agree to pay on demand the checks of the
customer to the holders who should present them? That such is
the contract of the bank cannot now be disputed. Indeed, upon
the strength of it the courts have very properly held that where the
banker refuses to pay a check upon presentment, by mistake, supposing at the time he was not in funds, when in fact be was, the
drawee could maintain an action of tort or contract, and recover
nominal damages, though he could prove no actual injury. Marzetti vs. Villiams, 1 B. & Ad. 415; Chitty on Bills, 280, 281;
Harker vs. Anderson, 21 Wend. 379; Little vs. The Phoenix
Bank, 2 Hill, 431; Whitacre vs. Bank of England, 1 Cromp.,
Mees. & Ros. 741.
There is also a principle of law equally well settled by a series of
authorities, as is the contract between the banker and his customer,
which is applicable to the case in hand, and which, applied to that
contract, seems to me deeisive. It is this :-Whenever one person
puts money into the hands of another to be paid to a third, or whenever one, for a good consideration, contracts with another that he
will do some act for the benefit of a third person, the third person,
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in such case, can maintain an action in his own name against the
person so receiving the money or making the provision for his benefit,
although there was no privity of contract between them, being in
fact perfect strangers. This has been settled in a great variety of
cases, both in this State and elsewhere, as where A paid B money,
with directions to pay it to 0, or where one, owing debts to various
persons, assigned property to another, taking his written agreement
to pay certain creditors of the assignor. 22 Am. Jur. 17 ; 2 Greenl.
Ev. 109; Arnold vs. Ljman, 17 Mass. 404; Hall vs. Marston,
17, Mass. 575 ; Felton vs. Dickinson,10 Mass. 287 ; Carnegie vs.
Mor.rison, 2 Met. 402; Fulton vs. Poole, T. RaymQnd, 802.
The objection that has been urged to a recovery by the plaintiffs,
that where one owes another, and the creditor undertakes to assign a
part of the debt, the debtor is not bound in law or equity to take
notice of such assignment, has no weight, and is not even applicable
to the case at bar. The reason given for the rule in that case is
this, the debt being entire, the debtor cannot, against his consent,
be made accountable to several debtors instead of one ; he can well
rely upon his contract, and say I agreed to pay one, not many.
This reason, and the only one given for it, does not apply in the
case of the banker, because he has contracted with his customer
that h4 would pay the funds in his hands to as many different persons, and in as many different parts as the customer should order
by his written checks. In the one case making the debtor liable to
more than one would be directly in conflict with his contract, and
in the other directly in accordance with its very terms.
We have then the contract of the banker with his customer who
deposits money with him, that he will pay it upon the written checks
of the depositor to the persons who shall present them ; and also
the well established principle of law, that whenever one promises
another that he will pay money, or do an act for the benefit of a
third person, the third person may sue in his awn name, although
no consideration moved from him, and no contract was made between
him and the person sued. Apply this clearly defined and authoritative
rule to the contract between the banker and his customer, and will it
not inure to the benefit of the holder of a check drawn by the depositor
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on the banker ? How can such a conclusion be escaped ? The
banker promises the depositor to pay the person who may hold and
present a check drawn by him, and on the strength of that promise
the holder takes the check and presents it; why should he not
maintain his action against the banker on the ground that the latter
has made a contract for his benefit, indeed to pay him money directly ? It would be admitted that the case would be within the
strict letter, as well as the spirit of the rule, if the persons in whose
favor checks were to be drawn were named at the time of the deposit.
Can the fact that the cestui que use, viz. the check holder, is not
named, make any difference in principle? There are a great variety
of contracts that are legal, and can be enforced by those who had
no interest in them at their inception, as in the familiar case of a
promise to pay a reward to any one who should restore lost or stolen
property; or the still more familiar one of a promise to pay money
to order or bearer, in either of which cases the contract might be
enforced by an action in the name of one not in esse at the time of
its inception.
But upon this point we are not without the aid of express authority,
and that of the highest character. In the case of Weston vs. Barker,
12 Johns. R. 276, a third person had assigned to the defendant
certain demands, which were to be collected by him, and appropriated
first to the payment of certain specific debts of the assignor, and the
balance held subject to his order. This assignment was accepted
by the defendant, and after he had collected the claims the assignor
ordered the defendant to account for the balance with the plaintiff,
which the defendant refused to do. The court held, that although
at the time the assignment was accepted the plaintiff was not named,
and although it was an agreement on the defendant's part to pay to
any person the assignor might order, still an action could be maintained against the defendant in the name of a payee of an order
subsequently drawn. This case seems to me to be decisive of the
objection that at the time of the banker's contract with his customer
the persons to whom the money is to be paid are not named. The
contract is to pay to the customer's order, and when the order or
check is drawn the person to whom payment is to be made becomes
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fixed and ascertained. To the same effect is the case of Fenner vs.
Meare-9, 2 Win. Bl. 1260. And although the authority of the case
has been somewhat questioned subsequently by Lords Kenyon and
Ellenborough, it was not overruled, and I think the opinion given
by Lord Chief Justice De Grey, and acquiesced in by the court,
addresses itself to the judgment as being both too well considered
and too well founded upon principle to be shaken by the hasty dicta
of the learned judges before mentioned. Indeed, if these two cases
are to be considered as authority, they would seem to go far towards
settling the main question in this case.
It is true, undoubtedly, that there is no precedent exactly in
point to sustain the position here taken, but it is equally true that
there is none directly in point against it. The boast of the common
law is, that it is not necessary to provide in terms for every possible
case that can arise out of the ever-varying and shifting, and almost
innumerable relations subsisting between men engaged in commerce
and business in a highly civilized community; but that it provides
a system, a collection of general principles applicable to all cases,
by which the rights and duties of each and all, growing out of such
relations, may be established and defined. To refuse to apply a
well established and general principle to a new case that may arise,
becaus6 there is no precedent for it, would be contrary to the policy of
the law, and directly in conflict with the genius of the whole system.
The result to which I have come is, that a holder of a check, who
presents it to the banker upon whom it is drawn, who is in funds on
account of the drawee, and is refused payment, can maintain his
action as well against the banker as the drawee. Such a rule would
work no .practical difficulty. On the contrary, no presentment for
acceptance being necessary, and bankers being obliged to pay in
the order in which checks are presented, it would add to the diligence of holders in collecting them, and increase confidence'in a
class of securities generally used and highly necessary in a business
and commercial community.
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FRANKLIN vs. THE STATE.

In the uKpreme Court of Alabama, June Term, 1856.
FRANKLYN vs. THE STATE.'
1.

Violent character of deceased, when admissible evidence.-The character of the
ased as a violent, turbulent, blood-thirsty man, when it qualifies, explains,
and gives point and meaning to his conduct, and tends to produce in the mind of
the slayer a reasonable belief of imminent danger, is admissible evidence for the
defendant; and there are cases, also, in which it may be looked to, in determining the amount of provocation, and thus fixing the degree of the homicide; but
the evidence in this case does not justify its admission on either of these grounds.

2. Characterhow proved.-The violent character of the deceased cannot be established by proof of isolated facts.
3. Misconduct ofjury.-The separation of the jury, for a short time, while considering of their verdict, is a matter to be considered by the court on motion for a new
trial, but is not a proper ground for a motion in arrest of judgment.
4. Refusal of new trial not revisable.-The action of the primary court on a motion
for a new trial is not revisable in the appellate court.

From the Circuii Court of Pike.
Tried before the Hon. E. W. PETTUS.
Indictment against Philemon J. Franklin for the murder of his
brother, Christopher Franklin, by shooting him with a gun. The
only evidence in relation to the killing was the testimony of a young
man, then about sixteen years of age, who was an eye-witness of it,
and whose testimony, in substance, is stated in the opinion of the
court. On the part of the prisoner, evidence of his peaceable
character was introduced; and he then offered to prove, "that the
deceased, some time before the killing, attempted to shoot a woman
in Coffee county, without any cause." This evidence, on objection
by the State, was excluded, and the prisoner excepted. The prisoner then offered to prove, "that the general character of the
deceased was that of a turbulent and dangerous man ;" but this
evidence also was excluded by the court, and the prisoner excepted.
After conviction, the prisoner moved to set aside the verdict,
I We

are indebted to the learned State Reporter, John W. Shepherd, Esq., for the

early ,heets of 29 Ala., where this and the next succeeding case will be found reported.
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"because the jury were allowed to separate while the trial of said

cause was in progress," and submitted an affidavit of the fact on
which the motion was predicated; but the court overruled the
motion, and the defendant excepted.
B. 0.' Bulock, for the prisoner.
1. While the bad character of the deceased, per se, does not in
the slightest degree affect the character of the homicide, it yet
becomes a legitimate and important subject of inquiry, where the
circumstances make the precise grade of the crime doubtful, and
where the ferocious temper of the deceased might furnish a key to
the whole transaction. The true test, as recognized by the cases
of Quesenberry and Pritchett, 3 Stew. & P. 808; 22 Ala. 40,
seems to be this: If the evidence of the homicide is so complete
anj satisfactory that, whatever m.y have been the -character of the
deceased, it could not have been so connected with the killing as to
change the grade of the offence, then the evidence is inadmissible;
but, on the other hand, if sufficient doubt hangs over the transaction
to make it probable that the character of the deceased may have
had some bearing on the character of the offence, then the evidence
ought to be admitted. The case at bar, tested by this rule, is preeminently one where the evidence should have been allowed to go
to the jury. There was but a single competent witness to the homicide, and he a youth of not more than sixteen years. That he did
not remember all that occurred, is admitted by himself; and that
he leaves some undoubted chasms in the conversation, is sufficiently
apparent. That the deceased loaded his gun, after having just fired
it off; that he followed defendant to his house, where his own violence was met by -words of kindness; that he seized defendant by
the hand,-a fact -wholly unexplained; and that the fatal shot was
fired, apparently without any immediate cause, by one whose whole
behavior up to that time had been peaceable,-all these facts make
the question of character highly material, and might enable us to
find in tLat character a solution of the mystery which certainlyovershadows the whole affair.
2. Tft tlie misconduct of .he iury was good ground for setting
aside i.],elct, see McCanr -s,The State, 9 Sm. & M. 465.
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X. A. Baldwin, Attorney Genera], contra.
1. The character of the deceased can never become a matter of
controversy, under an indictment for homicide, except when involved
in the res gestce. When a homicide is committed under such circumstances as tend to show that the prisoner acted in self-defence,
then the conduct of the person slain, constried with reference to his
known character, becomes a part of the transaction; but, when the
evidence not only fails to Ahow any conduct on the part of the
deceased which could raise the question of self-defence, but affirmatively shows (as it does here) that his situation and position precluded
that question, his bad character cannot be received to mitigate the
offence. On this point, see the following authorities: Wharton's
Criminal Law, 172; Pritchett vs. The State, 22 Ala. 42; Field

vs. The State, 14 Maine, 248; 8 iredell, 344; 1 Hawks, 210; 9
Yerger, 842.
2. As to the motion in arrest of judgment, see Brister vs. Te
State, 26 Ala. 133..
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-It has been twice decided in this State, and must
now be regarded as law, that the testimony, in prosecutions for
murder, may be such as will justify the admission of the bad character of the deceased as evidence for the accused, Quesenberry vs;
2The State, 3 S. & P. 808, Pritchett vs. The State, 22 Ala. 39.
In Quesenberry's case, this court declined to decide in favor of the
reception of such evidence, because, the facts not being disclosed
upon the record, it could not be perceived that the case presented
an aspect justifying it. In Pritchett's case, the object of the court
seems to have been to limit the admission of the evidence to cases
where it may be considered a part of the res qestce. In both cases,
it is carefully and properly denied that the bad character of the
deceased can, of itself, lessen the criminality of his murder. The
rule is laid down in Oliver's case, 17 Ala. 599, that "the necessity
which exculpates the accused from guilt, need not be actual; that
if the circumstances be such as to induce a reasonable belief that
WALKER,
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such necessity exists, the law will acquit the slayer of all guilt
It seems to result as a sequence from this principle, that the ch:
acter of the deceased for turbulence, violence, revengefulness, blo Ished and the like, where it qualifies, explains, and gives meani ig
and point to the conduct of the deceased, should be proper evidei - e.
Conduct of a man of pegceable character and harmless deportment,
might pass by without exciting a reasonable apprehension of impending peril; while, on the other hand, the same conduct, from a
man of notoriously opposite character and habits, might reason.ably
produce a consciousness of the most imminent peril, and a conviction
of the necessity of prompt defensive action. Whenever such bad
character on the part of the deceased thus illustrates the circumstances attending a homicide, and the circumstances, so i7lustrated,
tend to produce a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind
of the slayer, the character, as mingled with the- transaction is a
part of it, and is indispensable to its correct understanding. Such
we understand to be, in effect, the decisions in Quesenberry's and
Pritchett's cases.
To avoid detriment in the practical application of the rule, it
must be understood neither, on the one hand, to excuse the taking
of one's life because he is a bad man, nor, on the other, to be li nited
to those cases where the facts are such as to make it doubtful wl.ethcr
the homicide was committed se defendendo. The law cannot :.pportion the criminality of the homicide to the character of the dece.ased,
and it cannot confine the rule to cases of doubt; because, in such
cases, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal, and therefore, to so
limit it, would deny to it all practical effect. When the conduct of
the deceased, although in itself innocent, is such that, illustrated
by his character, its tendency is to excite a reasonable Lci.-f cf
imminent peril, the evidence ought to be admitted, and the question
of its effect left to the determination of the jury. It would be for
the court to determine, in every case, whether the facts are such as
will justify the admission of the evidence, as it is its duty to .leteimine, before receiving in evidence the declarations of third p'sot;
whether they are part of the res geatce.
We are of the opinion, also, that there are cases in .bi 'i 11-c
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character of the deceased might be looked to, in determining the
amount of provocation, and thus fixing the degree of the homicide.
We cite below the authorities which we have examined in reference to the questions above decided, some of which will be found
to militate against our opinion, and to be less favorable to the
accused. But the principles which we have laid down have the
fullest sanction of our judgment, because they are consistent with
the previous decisions of this court; and are, we think, founded in
justice and reason.-Wharton's American Criminal Law, 172;
Roscoe's Criminal Evidence, 89; Wharton's American Law of
Homicide, 249, 229; State vs. Barfield, 8 Iredell's Law, 344, dissenting opinion of Battle, J.; State vs. Thawley, 4 Harr. (Del.)
563; Wright vs. The State, 9 Yerger, 342; Dyson vs. The State,
26 Miss. 363.
We now turn to the testimony, for the purpose of inquiring
whether the circumstances were such that, under the rule we have
laid down, the character of the deceased, "as a turbulent and dangerous man," ought to have been admitted in evidence. The prisoner and deceased were brothers, and worked together in a blacksmith shop. The deceased went t. the prisoner's house, with a
loaded gun, late in the evening, and near the door of the prisoner's
house, used reproachful and angry words for some time, but did not
use any language of menace, or indicating an intention, either
present or prospective, to perpetrate violence upon the prisoner.
The deceased afterwards went into the house, where the prisoner
was at the time lying upon a bed. Immediately afterwards, the
prisoner said to the deceased, "you have come here with your arms,
and I have nothing to defend myself." "The deceased then placed
his gun on the bed on which the prisoner was lying, and turned and
walked off about ten feet to a table, and turned and sat down on
the table, with his face to the prisoner. As the deceased turned to
walk off from the bed, the prisoner seized the gun, cocked and presented it; and at the instant when the deceased sat down on the
table, the gun fired, and tle load entered the Lreast of the deceased,
who fell forward, with his head towards the bed, and his feet threc.
or four fect from the table, and expired in about half an hour.'
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The evidence conduced to show that the deceased carried the gun
for the purpose of shooting birds, and it does not appear that he
had any other arms. The deceased, upon the prisoner's suggestion
of his defenceless condition, not only disarmed himself, but placed
his gun in the power of the prisoner, and then walked away, with
his back to his slayer; and at the instant when he was seating himself, he received the contents of his own gun, from the hand of him
in whose power he appears to have placed it,-a token of trust, and
a sign of his own peaceful intention. There was not a word spoken,
not an act done, which, illustrated by the character of the deceased,
and construed by the prisoner in the light of that character, could
tend to produce a reasonable belief of imminent peril. Nor was
there any act or word from the prisoner, which, explained by his
character, could aggravate his conduct into such a provocation as
mitigate the offence to a lower degree.
The fact that the deceased had attempted to shoot a woman, was
not admissible in evidence. If it had been a case in which the
character of the deceased would have been competent evidence, it
would not have been permissible to make out the bad character by
isolated facts.-Nugent vs. The. State, 18 Ala. 521.
The separation of the jury for a short time, while they were consideripg of their verdict, is a matter to be considered by the court
which tries the case, upon motion'for a new trial, and is not a proper
ground for motion in arrest of judgment; and the decision of the
court below, on a question of new trial, is not revisable in this court.
-Brhiter vs. The State, 26 Ala. 107.
The juitgment of the court below must be affirmed, and its
sentence executed.
lNorTF0n the trial of an indictment for homicide, evidence to prove that the
deceasedI uas well known and understood generally by the accused and others to be

a quarr~Jbome, riot us and savage man, is inadmisible. State vs. Field, 14 Mlaine
Rep. 2 V!; Com. vs. York, 9 Metc. 110 ; State vs. Hawley, 4 Ilarring, 502 ; Stale
vs. Jackson, 17 Miss. 344; Com. vs. Hillyard, 2 Gray, 294; State vs. Brien, 10 LaIt. 453.

In a lite case in Massachusetts this point was thus summarily disposed of:

"J.

G. Al;_ z.ifr the defendant, offered evidence, that the general character and habit

of t!.-( 1 -- seI,

s

ere these cf a quarrelsome, fishting, vindictive and brutal man, o
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great strength, as a circumstance tending to show the nature and provocation under
which the defendant aefed, and that he had reasonable cause to fear great bodily
harm;" and cited Quesenberry vs. The State, 8 Steu. '& Port. 808; The State vs.
Tackett, 1 Hawks, 210; Oliver vs. The State, 17 Alaba. 599; Com. vs. Seibert;
Wharton on Homicide, 227. 3. H. Clifford, Xttorney General, objected to the admissibility of the evidence, and cited Com. vs. York, 7 Law Reporter, 507, 509.
By the court:-The evidence is inadmissible. If such evidence were admitted
on behalf of the prisoner, it would be competent for the Commonwealth to show that
the deceased was of a mild and peaceable character. Such evidence is too remote
and uncertain to havd any legitimate bearing on the question at issue. The provocation under which the defendant acted must be judged of by the reagest, and the
evidence must be confined to the facts and circumstances ittending the assault by
the deceased upon the defendant, Com. vs. Hillyard, 2 Gray's R. 294.
In the eye of the law, to murder the vilest and most abject of the human race, is as
great a crime as to murder its greatest benefactor. In one or two cases, however, while
the law, as above laid down, was distinctly recognized, it has been said that when
the killing has been under such circumstances as to create a doubt as to the character of the offence committed, the general character of the deceased may sometimes
be drawn into evidence, but the rule undoubtedly is that the character of the deceased can never be made a matter of controversy except when involved in the re
gestc, for it would be a barbarous thing to allow A. to give as a reason for his killing
B., that B's disposition was savage and riotous. The defendant may prove that he
was acting in self defence, or he may exhibit whatever provocations were given to
him by the deceased, or he may put in evidence threats and expressions of hostile
feeling from the deceased to himself, hut he cannot set up general reputation as a
defence. Thus: on an indictment against an overseer for the murder of his employer,
it is not competent for the prisoner to offer evidence of the general temper and
deportment of the deceased towards his overseers and tenants. When, however, it
is shown that the defendant was under a reasonable fear of his life from the deceased,
the deceased's temper, in connection with previous threats, &c., is sufficiently part
of the res gpest to go in evidence as explanatory of the state of defence in -which the
defendant placed himself; and it certainly is admissible to show that the deceased
was possessed of preponderating strength, and that his character was so far desperate as to necessitate the extremest precautions on the part of a person attacked by
him. The question then is, not whether A. was justified in killing B., because B.
was savage and riotous, but whether A., being attacked, he was justified in concluding that killlng B. was his only chance of escaping with his own life. Wharton's
Criminal Law, J C41, 4th ed., 18-57.-Ed Am. Law. Beg.
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In tie Supreme Court of Alabama, 7une Term, 1856.
STEIN VS. BURDEN.

1. Righds of .'iparianproprietorto use of water of running stream.-A riparian proprietbr has the right to use the water which flows by or through his lands, for all
ordinary purposes, and for the gratification of natural wants, even though the
entire stream is thereby consumed; and also the right to its extraordinary or
artificial use, provided it is not thereby forced back on the lands of the proprietor
above him, is not unreasonably and injuriously precipitated on the lands of the
proprietor below, and is restored without material diminution, before it leaves his
lands, to its accustomed channel.
2. His duty to restore water diverted for artifcial puryoses.-If a riparian proprietor
diverts the water of a running stream for artificial purposes, in quantities sufficient to affect injuriously the rights of the proprietor below him, and does not
restore it to its natural channel, without material diminution, before it reache4
the lands of that proprietor, he is liable in damages for the injury; and that the
means provided by him for its restoration are rendered inefficient for that purpose,
after the water has left his land, by the act or inteference of a third person,
though it might mitigate the damages, is no excuse for the failure, since the right
to divert it is only conditional, and ceases when the water cannot be restored.
(Rice, C. J., dissenting.)
3. Substance of issue and variance.-Wheh the complaint alleges that the defendant
wrongfully diverted the water, while the evidence shows that, though the water
was originally diverted by him, he provided means for its return to its natural
channel above plaintiff's lands, and that its return was prevented by the act of
another person after it left defendant's land, there is no material variance between
the allegations and proof. (Rice, C. J., dissenting.)

Appeal fri m the City .Court of Mobile.
Trio1 bcf.:re the Hon. ALEX. MCKINSTtY.
The niatei al facts of this case, as embodied in the opinion of the
court, are the following: "This was an action by a riparian proprietor, own'c:g lands on both sides of Three-mile creek, near Mobile,
to iecwvr d~mages for defendant's diversion of water from said
creek, at a p-int above the lands of plaintiff, to the alleged detriment of plat.tiff and his mill-interest on said creek. The complaint
alleges that, 'n the 20th Novcmber, 1851, and on divers other days
and times - -tween that tiu. and the filing of the complaint, 3d
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November, 1853, the defendant 'wrongfully and injuriously diverted,
and turned out of its natural channel, at a point above the land and
premises of plaintiff, a large portion of the water of said creek, so
that the same was thereby wholly diverted and turned away from
the land and mill of the plaintiff, and prevented from flowing as it
had been accustomed, and would otherwise have flowed, through
said lands, and by said mill, but for such diversion.'
The bill of exceptions shows, that the defendant had dug a ditch,
to convey the water back into the channel of the creek above plaintiff's mill; 'which said ditch would do, but from the fact, that some
persons other than the parties to this suit had opened a ditch, to
lead the water from said Three-mile creek down to a paper-mill,
which last-mentioned ditch unites with the creek at the same point
that Stein's ditch does; so that much of the water that runs out of
Stein's ditch is carried down the ditch that runs to the pnper-mill,
and does not return to the creek above Burden's mill.' There was
a conflict in the testimony, whether Stein's ditch, or the ditch to
the paper-mill, was first dug. Stein did not own the land where
the two ditches intersected the creek.
The court was requested by the defendant to charge the jury,
That if Stein had dug his return ditch, so as to carry off all the
surplus water into the creek, and afterwards some other person,
without his concurrence, bad opened the ditch to the paper-mill on
the city property, so as to carry water out of Stein's ditch down to
the -paper-mill, that Stein was not chargeable with the water so
carried down said ditch.' This charge the court gave, with the
following qualification : ' That if Stein abstracted the water from
the creek, it was his duty to see that it was returned into the creek
above plaintiff's mill; and if any other person had opened a ditch,
so as to take the water from Stein's ditch down towards the papermill, with Stein's knowledge, and if Stein did not, within a reasonable time after such knowledge, provide means of returning the
water to the creek, but permitted it still to flow-so that the water
did not run from his premises back into the creek above Burden's
mill,-thea Stein would still be liable for not returning the water.'
To this qualification the defendant excepted."
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B. ff. Smith and P. S, Blount, for appellant.
The principal question raised by the record, is, in substance,
whether a riparian proprietor, who diverts water for his mill, but
returns it to its original stream, so as not to injure the proprietor
below him, is responsible for a diversion caused by a third person,
who intersects the artificial channel provided for the restoration of
the .Water, just at its mouth, on his own land. This question arises
in two aspects: 1. Can a recovery be had on .a declaration, which
alleges no special damage, but only charges Stein with diverting the
water. That it cannot, see the following authorities : Sedgwick on
Damages, 76, 77; 1 Chitty's Pleading, 896; Fitzsimmons ys. Inglis, 5 Taunton, 584; .De Porest vs. Leete, 16 Johns. 122.
2. Under no declaration could Stein be made liable for the diversion of Portier, or required to put an end to the wrong done by a
third person; especially as it was not on his land.-Authorities
supra; also, Vicars vs. Milcocks, 8 East, 1; Livie vs. Janson,
12 East, 648; Flower vs. Adam, 2 Taunton, 814; -De Vauz vs.
Salvador, 4 Ad. & El. 420; Burrows vs. Tright, 1 East, 615;
Olneq vs. Penner, 2 Rhode Island R. 214; Armstrong vs. Percy,
5 Wendell, 588; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 256.
Y. B. Sewall, contra.
1. The charge requested by the appellant was not law, and even
the qualification given was too favorable to him. His obligation to
restore tl c water which he had diverted, before it reached the plaintiff's lands, to its accustomed channel, results from the nature of
tLe property in running water, and the rules which have been universally applied to regulate its use. No riparian proprietor has the
right to use the water to the prejudice of other proprietors, above or
l low him. Though he may use the water while it runs over his
lands, he cannot unreasonably detain it, or give it another direction;
and Ve must return it to its ordinary channel when it leaves his
cstatc. To say that another person has interrupted the return, is
7.o excuse for his failure to return the water. The diversion is at
lis
. I who di% rts; and if he cannot return the water, after a
-. .
,lea " it, he must not divert it.-3 Kent's Com. 439,
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441; Angell on Water-Courses, §§ 5, 90, 94, 95, 97; Beissell vs.
Sho.l, 4 Dallas, 211; Parker vs. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288; Omelvany vs. Jaggers, 2 Hill's (S. C.) R. 634; Howell vs. feGoy; 3
Rawle, 256; Wood vs. Waud, 3 W., H. & G. (Exch.) 748; Blanchard vs. Baker, 8 Greenl. 266; mbry vs. Owen, 6 W., H. & G.
(Exch.) 367-70; McAlmont vs. Whitaker, 3 Rawle, 84; 20 Penn.
State R. 89; 5 Vermont, 871; 9 Watts, 119; 2 Denio, 443; 1
Bos. & Pul. 404.
2. Under the complaint, the plaintiff was entitled to recover
damages for any diversion of the water of Thuee-mile creek which
the evidence might establish. The evidence corresponded substantially with the averments of the complaint, and entitled the plaintiff
to a recovery.-Shears vs. Wood, 7 Moore, 345; Bicetts vs. Salwey, 2 Barn. & Ald. 860; Burdick vs. Glasco, 18 Conn. 494;
Hutchinson vs. Granger, 13 Vermont, 386; Pastoriusvs. Fisher,
1 Rawle, 27; Arnold vs. Foot, 12 Wendell, 330; Hodges vs. Hodges, 5 Metcalf, 205.
STONE, J.-(After stating the facts above set forth.) It will be
observed that we have made no distinction between the water which
Stein attempted to restore to the creek by his return ditch, and that
portion which entered his pipes to be consumed in Mobile. No
question was raised in reference to the latter.
The entire question in the case resolves itself into the
inquiry,

what property has a riparian proprietor in the water which flows
through or by his land? "1He has no property in the water itself,
but a simple usufruct while it passes along." Aqua ourrit, et debet
currere.-3 Kent's Com. 439. "He may use the water while it
runs over his land, but he cannot unreasonably detain it, or give it
another direction; and he must return it to its ordinary channel
when it leaves his estate."-Ib.
In Beissell vs. Sholl, 4 Dallas, 211, it was held, that the owner
of land, through which a stream flowed, had an uncqLiestionable right
to use the water passing through his land as he pleases; subject,
among other things, to the condition, that after using the water, he
returns the stream to its ancient channel.
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In two other controlling cases in Pennsylvania, .MeCalmont vs.
Whitaker, 8 Rawle, 84, and Howell vs. Mccoy, Ib. 256, the right
to the use of the water is distinctly stated; but it is added, that the
person using it is bound to return the water, so diverted, without
unnecessary waste or diminution, into the naturalchannel.
The old maxim, "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lcedas," is a
cherished principle of the common law. It was early applied to
the use of water flowing in a stream. As early as 32 Edw. III.,
where a proprietor had diverted water from its accustomed channel,
to the injury of a land owner on the stream below him, it was
adjudged, that "the water should be removed into the ancient
channcl, at the cost of the defendant." The same doctrine, in substance, was again asserted in Brown vs. Best, 1 Wilson's Rep. 174.
See, also, Bealey vs. Shaw, 6 East, 208; Wright vs. Howard, 1
Sim. t Stu. 190; Mason vs. Hill, 5 Barn. & Adolph. 1.
In Tyler vs. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397, Justice Story laid down
the saile doctrine, in a well considered and forcible opinion. So
also, in Gardnervs. Village, &c., 2 Johns. Oh. 162, Ch. Kent, with
his accustomed clearness, has given to the same side of this question
the sai:ction of his splendid intellbct. To the same effect, are coalter
vs. Hunter, 4 Rand. 56; ffutchinsbn vs. Ooleman, 5 Halst. 74;
A
vs.
birg Tiffany, 9 Conn. 162; Blanchard vs. Baker, 8 Greenl.
253: 'JqTartin vs. Jett, 12 Louisiana Rep. 501; Smith vs. Adams,
6 Pai!,(-, 435 ; colburn vs. Richards, 13 Mass. 420; cVook vs. Hull,
3 P:t
269; V]an Berger vs. Van Berger, 8 Johns. Ch. 282;
lJerrihl vs. Brinkerhoff, 17 Johns. 306; Arnold vs. Toot, 12 Wend.
330; ihart vs. .vans, 8 Penn. 1; Hill vs. Sayles, 4 Oush. 553.
To 'iislong list of authorities, I might add others, almost without
limit. I have not been able to find one authority which conflicts
with tl.em in principle. All hold the *uniform language, that he
-who (diverts water from its natural course, must restore it to its
origiu, channel, without material diminution. 2 Hill on Real
A
Prop. 9-100.
In a well considered opinion, Oh. J. Ruffin, after endorsing, in
substanc.?, the above doctrine, proceeds to mention the uses to which
all men -nay apply water; namely, ad lavandum et potandum.I
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.Pugh vs. Fh7eeler, 2 Dev. & Bat. 50. To these uses, other authorities have added, that he may use so much as may be wanted for his
cattle.-Brown vs. Best, 1 Wils. 174; Simith vs. Adams, 6 Paige,
435. He cannot, however, consume the water, even in the irrigation of his land, to the detriment of riparian proprietors below.Arnold vs. Foot, 12 Wend. 380; Cook vs. Hull, 8 Pick. 209. See,
also, these several subjects ably discussed, with corresponding conclusions, in Angell on Water-Courses, pp. 83 to 100; 8 Kent's
Com. 439 to 441; and numerous authorities cited by these latter
authors.
This subject has been considered in this court. In Hendricks vs.
Johnson, 6 Porter, 472, our predecessors said: "All proprietors
of lands have precisely the same rights to waters flowing through
their domains, and one can never be permitted so to use the stream,
as to injure or annoy those who are situated on the course of it,
either above or below him." * * * One occupying a position as
a land holder above another, and on the same stream, "would be
protected by the conimon law in the use of any dam he might choose
to erect, if in so doing he caused no injury to [the proprietor below]
by withholding the water of the stream from him."
In a case between the parties to this suit, for a former diversion
of the water of the same stream, and by the same means disclosed
in this record, this court used the language, "That a riparian proprietor has the right to consume even the whole of the water of a
stream, if absolutely necessary for the wants of himself and family."
* * "but this doctrine can have no application" to a case like ihe
present.-Stein vs. Burden, 24 Ala. 130.
In a still later case between these parties, commenced by bill in
chancery, it was said by this court, that Burden had "established
his right as riparian proprietor to the use of the water in'its accustomed flow, by proving that he is the owner of the lands on both
sides of the creek, and that Stein [had] diverted the water in pipes
to the etty of Mobile. "-Burden vs. Stein, 27 Ala. 104.
If these numerous citations settle any thing, they certainly establish, at least, the following propositions:
1. That each riparian proprietor has the right to use the water
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which flows from or through his lands, for all ordinary purposes,
and for the gratification of natural wants, even though, in such use,
he consume the entire stream; that this right extends to the use of
the water ad lavandum et potandum, both by himself, and all living
things in his legitimate employment.
2. That such 'proprietor has also the right to the extraordinary
or artificial use of the stream and the water composing it, provided
that, by such use, the water is not forced back on the lands of the
proprietor above, is not unreasonably and injuriously precipitated
on the lan.ds of the prooirietor below, and, after its use, is restored,
without material diminution, and before it leaves the lands of the
person diverting, to its accustomed channel.
3. That if water be diverted for artificial use from its natural
channel, in quantity sufficient to affect injuriously the rights of the
proprietor below, and the water be not returned to its channel before
it reach the lands of such proprietor, he may recover damages therefor of the party who causes the injury.
It is thus shown, that the right of a riparian proprietor, to divert
water from its channel, is conditional; qualified by a corresponding
duty, to restore the water thus diverted to the stream from which
it was taken. The question is presented in this case, what'lis the
exteit'of this obligation to restore the water? Is it-continuing ?
If so, how long does it continue? Will any, and what excuse, avail
to reli :ve a party from this obligation to return the water?
Evidently, as to such portion of the water as a party, under the
above rules. may: use in the gratification of ordinary wants, and a
portion .of ,hich, in the nature of things, will perish in the using,
no question can arise on the duty to restore. This is, generally, a
use of the water itself, as severed and contradistinguished from the
stream. Tliis use is one of the incidents of riparian proprietorship,
and dcs not trench on the freehold interests of the owners below.
The right to the stream, or the water in its aggregate character,
is a dfferent question. It consists of the body of water which at
a-iy and all times rests on and flows over the lands of the claimant.
The rearn is a part of the freehold.-Burden vs. Stein, 24 Ala. 180;
-amn parties, 27 Ala. 104. This freehold character is not lost;

STEIN vs. BURDEN.

though the particular water which composes the stream is continually
changing. Every owner has a property in the stream that flows
through his land; while he has rio property in the water of which
it is composed, save for the gratification of his natural or ordinary
wants as above shown.
A right to the use of a stream being a part of the freehold interest, that right is co-existent with the right to the land over which
it flows. Diversion of the water of the stream is an act continuous
in its character; and each effluence of the water, resulting from the
unauthorized act of another, is a wrong done to a proprietor below,
if thereby the flow of the stream to him is materially diminished.Burden vs. Stein, 27 Ala. 113. It is a continuing nuisance; and
an action lies for the damages, toties quoties.-Burddn vs. Stein,
24 Ala. 147, and authorities cited. The maxim of the law is, aqua
curit, et debet currere ut solebat. Each successive flow being a
new wrong, a nuisance continued, imposes a corresponding cotemporaneous obligation to return such water to the channel of the
stream.
The argument, then, that a party who diverts water, and provides
the means for its return, may then rest-that he may then continue
to abstract large quantities of water, which water is not in fact
restored to its accustomed channel, cannot be supported. It is no
answer that the water would have continued to flow back into the
stream, had not a stranger, by his unauthorized interference, rendered
the means provided powerless to accomplish the object. He abstracts
the water at his peril. His right to do go is not an absolute, but a
qualified right. It only becomes a right, when by restoration, it
ceases to work an injury to another. The diversion is prima facie
a nuisance; and each continuance places the party under obligations to 4bate it. It is no defence, in such case, that the" author of
the act was willing to apply the correctiye, but was prevented.
This rule, under the circumstances, is not a severe one. It only
enjoins that the assumed right to abstract shall be abandoned,
whenever the water cannot be returned.
The argument against these views rests on the fallacy which
places the diversion of water among the absolute rights of parties.
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It is contingent; made absolute only so long as the diverted watei
flows back.
The charge as asked should not have been given. Both it, and
the explanatory charge, laid down a rule too favorable to the appellant. The supposed excuse for not returning the water was
wholly insu!Ncient.. The facts supposed in the explanatory charge
would reduce the damages; but even they would not entirely excuse
the wrong.- Fan Hoesen vs. Coventry, 10 Barb. 518.
It was contended in argument, that the averments of the complaint and t!,e proofs did not correspond; that the gravamen of the
complaint is the act of Stein, while the testimony shows the injury
to be the result of the act of another. It was also urged, that the
damages proved are too remote from the act of Stein to justify a
recovery against him. The numerous and respectable authorities
cited, fully ctablieh the legal principles contended for, if the facts
.f this case brought it within the influence of those decisions. But
they do not. The lialility in this case rests on the naked fact, that
'tein, after diverting the water, did not return it; not on the reasons
vhy he did not. His excuse for not returning, as we think we have
Filown, is wholly insufficient; and we not only know no rule of
!caling which requires that such excuse or pretext should be stated,
1jt
cannot conceive of any form or mode of expression, by which
r'ch immath.rial fact could be presented in the complaint, without
,"'C;ing th, proceedings, while it could not affect the result.,'.za; . vs. Wfood, 7 J. B. Mloore, 345.
The argament that the damages are too remote, is answered,
'Ihe I it is Jhown to be the duty of Stein to restore the water to the
strear. 'Ihus vicwed, the injury to Burden is the direct result of
Stein's wrongful act.
Thice iAno errcr in the record of which appellant can complain,
and tl e ju.lment of the City Court is affirmed.
lr,

0. J., dissenting.

